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1 Introduction
Why do governments so often fail to adopt economic policies that economists consider
efficiency-enhancing? This is the question addressed in an influential paper by Raquel
Fernandez and Dani Rodrik (1991). They argue that one of the reasons why governments
often dismiss reform is that individual winners and loser cannot be identified beforehand.
This generates individual-specific uncertainty which leads to a bias against efficiency-
enhancing economic policies and towards the status quo.
Fernandez and Rodrik (FR) first illustrate their point using an example and then
develop it more precisely using a trade-model which, they argue, generalizes their example
and puts it into a general-equilibrium context. The basic point of their introductory example
can be easily illustrated by the following (somewhat different but simpler) example. Assume
that there is an economic policy which, if put into place, increases the income of a fraction
01 a <<  of the population by an amount equal to  0 g >  and decreases the income of all
others by an amount  0 l < . Suppose that the policy is adopted if a majority votes in favour
and rejected otherwise. These assumptions combined imply that if all individuals know
whether they will gain or lose at the time they vote—i.e. there is no individual-specific
uncertainty—then the new economic policy will be supported by a fraction a  of voters and
enacted if and only if  1/2 a ‡ . Now suppose that people do not know with certainty
whether they will gain or loose at the time they vote—i.e. there is individual-specific
uncertainty. Instead, voters only know that a fraction a  of them will gain  0 g >  while all
others will loose  0 l < , and they therefore conclude that the probability  p  of being among
the winners is equal to a . Consequently, risk-neutral agents will vote in favour of the
policy if and only if their expected gain  (1) agal p =+- is positive. This implies that
support for the economic policy in this static example may be greater or smaller with
individual-specific uncertainty than without. In particular, support for the policy will be
greater (smaller) with individual-specific uncertainty than without if the expected gain is
positive (strictly negative). The economic policy may therefore be enacted with individual-
specific uncertainty in cases it would have been rejected without and vice-versa. FR find
exactly the same result in their static example and therefore conclude that, in a static
scenario, individual-specific uncertainty does neither generate a bias against reform nor lead
to an asymmetry between the case with individual-specific uncertainty and the case without.￿ 2 ￿
FR argue that an asymmetry between these two cases will, however, arise naturally
in a dynamic, two-period model. To see why suppose that the economic policy is put to
vote twice: in the beginning of the first period and, again, in the beginning of the second
period. Assume also that those who will gain g  in each period where the economic policy
is in place are a fraction a  of the electorate. All remaining voters will lose  0 l <  in each
period where the economic policy is in place. Finally, suppose that there are no costs of
enacting or reversing the policy and that voters apply a discount rate  0 d ‡  to second
period payoffs. Consider first the situation where voters know in the beginning of the first
period whether they gain or loose from the economic policy. In this case, the following
equilibria emerge. If  1/2 a ‡ , then voters anticipate that the policy will be passed in the
beginning of the second period whether or not it has been passed in the beginning of the
first period. This implies that a fraction  1/2 a ‡  of voters know that their discounted gain
of the economic policy being enacted in the beginning of the first period is (1) g d + .
Consequently, the policy will be enacted in the first period and sustained in the second
period. If  1/2 a < , however, then the policy will be rejected in the beginning of the first
period and rejected again in the beginning of the second period. The situation is somewhat
more complex in the case with individual-specific uncertainty. In the beginning of the first
period, voters only know the fraction of people who will gain or loose from the policy but
not whether they will be among the winners or losers. They also realize, however, that if
the policy is put into place during the first period, then everybody finds out about being
either a winner or loser and votes accordingly when trade-reform is put to vote again in the
beginning of the second period. Consequently, voters anticipate in the beginning of the first
period that if the economic policy is enacted, then it will be sustained in the election in the
beginning of the second period if and only if  1/2 a ‡ . Hence, if  1/2 a ‡ , then voters know
that their expected discounted gain of the economic policy being enacted in the beginning
of the first period is (1) dp + . If  1/2 a < , on the other hand, then voters know that their
expected discounted gain of passing the policy in the first period is p ; this is because the
economic policy, if enacted in the first period, will not find enough support to be sustained
in the beginning of the second period. Combining these two cases yields that if voters are
risk-neutral, then the policy will be enacted in the beginning of the first period if  0 p ‡  (and
be sustained in the beginning of the second period if and only if  1/2 a ‡ ) and rejected in the
beginning of the first period if  0 p < . If the economic policy is rejected in the beginning of
the first period, then it will be rejected again in the beginning of the second period as no
new information about the identity of winners and losers becomes available. The next table
summarizes all equilibria.
                     Table 1: Equilibria in the Two-Period Example￿ 3 ￿
1/2 a ‡ 1/2 a <
Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2
CERTAINTY Pass Sustain Reject Reject
Pass ( 0 p ‡ ) Sustain Pass ( 0 p ‡ ) Reject UNCERTAINTY
Reject ( 0 p < ) Reject Reject ( 0 p < ) Reject
The table illustrates that in the two-period example there is an asymmetry in how
individual-specific uncertainty affects economic policies that would have been in place in
the second period under certainty compared to how it affects policies that would not have
been in place in the second period under certainty. If an economic policy would not have
been in place in the second period under certainty, it will not be in place with individual-
specific uncertainty. On the other hand, if a policy would have been in place in the second
period under certainty, it might not be in place with individual-specific uncertainty. This is
the asymmetry that FR argue explains why individual-specific uncertainty works against
efficiency-enhancing policies in a dynamic scenario. In fact, Table 1 shows that this
asymmetry implies that the policy is less likely to be in place in the second period with
individual-specific uncertainty than without.
1
It is interesting to note, however, that individual-specific uncertainty does not work
against efficiency-enhancing policies, i.e. reform, in the example of Table 1.
2 Instead,
individual-specific uncertainty only works against economic policies that strictly decrease
aggregate income. To see this clearly notice that the policy is less likely to be in place with
individual-specific uncertainty than without because if  0 p < , then the economic policy is
rejected in both periods in the case with individual-specific uncertainty even if  1/2 a ‡ .
Moreover,  0 p <  if and only if the policy strictly decreases aggregate income, i.e.
(1)0 agal +-< . Hence, the economic policy is less likely to be in place with individual-
specific uncertainty than without only because, with individual-specific uncertainty, it will
be rejected if it strictly decreases aggregate income. Individual-specific uncertainty
                                                       
1 There is an alternative reading of FR’s use of the “asymmetry”, “bias towards the status-quo”, and “bias
against reform” introduced by individual-specific uncertainty. This reading is that they only refer to
following two facts: (I) with individual-specific uncertainty, reform may be enacted in the first period and
revoked in the second period, while reform will always be sustained if enacted under certainty; (II) reform
will be rejected in the second period if rejected in the first period whether or not there is individual-specific
uncertainty. This definition implies that, as long as (I) and (II) hold, individual-specific uncertainty will
introduce a bias towards the status-quo in the “alternative FR sense” even if the status-quo is overturned for
a set of model-parameters that have 99% probability with individual-specific uncertainty but only 1%
probability under certainty. Similarly, individual-specific uncertainty would introduce a bias against reform
in the “alternative FR sense” even if reform is enacted and sustained for parameters that have 99%
probability with uncertainty but only 1% probability under certainty.
2 Reform is defined as a change for the better or an improvement in the 4
th Edition of The American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language.￿ 4 ￿
therefore only works against change to the worse. If the economic policy results in a
change to the better—i.e. increases aggregate income—then the policy is as likely to be in
place in the second period in the case with individual-specific uncertainty than in the case
without. Combined, these last two results yield that enacted economic policies are strictly
more likely to increase aggregate income with individual-specific uncertainty than without.
3
Individual-specific uncertainty therefore decreases the probability that efficiency-enhancing
policies are enacted but, at the same time, increases the probability that enacted policies are
efficiency-enhancing in the example in Table 1.
The result that individual-specific uncertainty only works against economic policies
that strictly decrease aggregate income is the main difference between the example in Table
1 and a two-period version of FR’s introductory example. In a two-period version of their
example, individual-specific uncertainty will work both against policies that decrease
aggregate income and policies that increase aggregate income. Hence, in their example,
enacted policies will be less likely to increase aggregate efficiency with individual-specific
uncertainty than without if and only if the probability of uncertainty leading to the rejection
of efficiency-enhancing policies is greater than the probability of uncertainty leading to the
rejection of policies decreasing aggregate efficiency.
FR argue that their introductory example does not address key-questions like, for
instance, the source of uncertainty and general-equilibrium aspects of policy-change.
Moreover, they are interested in applying their argument to trade-reform. They therefore
elaborate on their point by developing a two-period, two-sector trade-model where
workers vote on trade-reform in the beginning of each period and decide whether to switch
sector immediately afterwards. The most important difference between FR’s trade-model
and their introductory example is that, in their trade-model, reform affects not only payoffs
but also the economic environment and hence individual economic behavior. The objective
of the remainder of this paper is to show that, as a result, second-period reform may be in
place in FR’s trade-model in the case with individual-specific uncertainty, even if it would
have been rejected in both periods under certainty. This stands in contrast to the main result
of a two-period version of their introductory example; there, reform would always be
revoked in the second period in the case with individual-specific uncertainty if it would not
have been enacted under certainty. To use FR’s terminology, the remainder of this paper
shows that, in their two-period trade-model, individual-specific uncertainty does not
generate any asymmetry between the case where second-period trade-reform would be in
place under certainty and the case where second-period trade-reform would not be in place
                                                       
3 This is because, with individual-specific uncertainty, all enacted policies increase aggregate income while
some of the policies enacted without individual-specific uncertainty will decrease aggregate income.￿ 5 ￿
under certainty. Consequently, it cannot be shown that individual-specific uncertainty leads
to a bias against trade-reform in their two-period model.
The most important (but not the only) reason why FR’s trade-model yields that
second-period reform may be in place in the case with individual-specific uncertainty, even
if it would have been rejected in both periods under certainty, is straightforward. If there is
individual-specific uncertainty and reform is enacted in the first period, then support for
sustaining trade-reform in the beginning of second period (when all individual-specific
uncertainty has been resolved) will be greater than support for enacting reform in the first
period under certainty; for comparison, in a two-period version of FR’s introductory
example as well as the example in Table 1, second-period support for a reform enacted in
the first period with individual-specific uncertainty will be identical to support for the policy
in the first period under certainty. This feature of FR’s two-period trade-model implies that
reform may find enough support to be sustained in the second period, even if it would not
have found enough support to be enacted in the first period had there been no individual-
specific uncertainty. The intuition for this result is simple. Once trade-reform has been
enacted, some of the workers who would have voted against it under certainty will
nevertheless switch to the sector that gains (even if they have not incurred any sunk cost).
These workers will vote against revoking trade-reform in the future. This argument applies
to any type of reform. In a realistic setting, reform will increase the incentives of economic
agents to move into those economic activities that benefit from the new economic policies.
If some agents respond to these incentives, then support for sustaining reform in future
elections (when individual-specific uncertainty has been resolved) will be greater than
support for enacting reform in the case without individual-specific uncertainty.
This explains why reform, once enacted, may persist in the case with individual-
specific uncertainty, even if it would have been rejected in both periods under certainty. But
will trade-reform ever be enacted in the case with individual-specific uncertainty if it would
have been rejected under certainty? There are two reasons why this may be the case in FR’s
trade-model. The more realistic one is that a majority of workers may end up losing a little
from reform and a minority gaining a lot; this implies rejection by a majority under certainty
but acceptance with individual-specific uncertainty if those workers who will end up losing
a little believe that there is a chance of them being among the winners. The second and
more interesting reason is that workers actually like individual-specific uncertainty. This is
because they enjoy the upside potential of the uncertainty without having to bear the
downside risk as they always have the option of staying in the sector they worked in
originally should they find out that their uncertain net income in the sector gaining from
reform is too low.￿ 6 ￿
To be more precise assume, like FR, that workers are risk-neutral and that
individual-specific uncertainty arises because they will find out about their cost of switching
to the sector gaining from trade-reform only after reform has been passed for the first time.
Clearly, this implies that workers will only change sector if their switching-cost turns out to
be below some threshold; if the cost is high, workers will simply stay in the sector they
worked in originally. Workers’ payoff if trade-reform is enacted is therefore a convex
function of their switching-cost. Hence, assuming that workers know the distribution of
switching-costs in the population, their expected utility of enacting trade-reform may be
positive, even if ex-post utility is negative for more than half of the values of the switching-
cost (Michael Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz (1970)). Trade-reform may therefore be
enacted with individual-specific uncertainty, even if it would have been rejected by a
majority had workers known their switching-cost. Moreover, trade-reform may be enacted
with individual-specific uncertainty even if it would have been rejected by a majority had
workers known their switching-cost, because the median of the switching-cost may be
higher than its expected value. The reasons why, in FR’s trade-model, reform once enacted
may be sustained in the second period (when workers have found out about their switching-
cost), even if it would not have been enacted had workers known their switching-cost, are
twofold. The more interesting reason is that, in the case with individual-specific
uncertainty, some of the workers who would have voted against enacting trade-reform had
they known their switching-cost, will nevertheless go to work in the sector that gains in the
first period and vote against revoking trade-reform in the second period. These workers
would have voted against trade-reform had they known their switching-costs in the
beginning of the first period, because they prefer to stay in the sector they work in before
reform at before trade-reform prices rather than work in the sector that gains from reform
at after trade-reform prices. Once trade-reform has been passed, however, workers will
compare working in the two sectors at after trade-reform prices. As reform implies that
relative prices change in favour of the sector that gains, switching becomes relatively more
attractive after trade-reform is in place. To complete the argument it is important to note
that workers will not consider the effect of their first-period switching-decision on voting
outcomes as they anticipate that their individual vote is inconsequential for trade-reform
being sustained or revoked in the future. A second, less interesting reason why trade-
reform may be sustained in the second period in FR’s trade-model, even if it would not
have been enacted in the first period had voters known their switching-cost, is that FR
assume that there may be a sunk-cost of switching sector.￿ 7 ￿
The main point made in this paper is related to the literature on policy persistence
and the recent work by Coate and Morris (1999).
4 Like this paper, Coate and Morris (CM)
emphasize that “[w]hen an economic policy is introduced, agents will often respond by
undertaking actions in order to benefit from it. These actions will translate […] into
political pressure to retain the policy […].” There are, however, major differences between
the present paper and FR on the one hand and CM on the other. First, CM suppose that
voters do not decide directly on the policy; instead, decisions are taken by an elected
politician. Second, they assume that the policy only benefits politicians and firms but not
voters (who would therefore always reject the policy if they were to vote on it directly).
Third, CM assume that firms have to incur a switching-cost every time they change sector
(while the present paper allows for the case where workers can switch back to the sector
they worked in originally at no cost). Most importantly CM address a different question
than FR and the present paper. FR and the present paper ask whether efficiency-enhancing
policies are more or less likely in the presence of individual-specific uncertainty than in the
case where everybody is certain about the policy’s consequences. CM analyze the question
of policy-persistence without addressing or modeling the role of individual-specific
uncertainty, focusing instead on the persistence of policies that may increase the income of
a corrupt politician but decrease welfare of voters in general.
2 A Model of Trade-Reform
FR discuss the role of individual-specific uncertainty for trade-reform in an open, perfectly
competitive, two-sector economy. They present both a one and two-period model, which
will be discussed in detail in the next two sections.
2.1 The Static Model
There are two sectors,  X  and Y , that produce different goods with constant-returns-to-
scale technologies using labor only. Wages and prices are expressed in terms of good Y .
Before trade-reform, wages are identical in both sectors. Workers in the economy are
considering whether to support a trade-reform that will leave the sector-Y-wage wY  and
the wage in sector  X  in terms of good  X  unchanged but increase the price of good  X
and hence the sector-X-wage wX  in terms of good Y . Once trade-reform is passed,
workers can switch between sectors at a cost that comes in two parts: a part common to all
workers that must be paid if workers want to have the option of switching sector, and an
                                                       
4 See also Brainard and Verdier (1994) and Rodrik (1991).￿ 8 ￿
individual-specific part that workers only have to pay if they actually switch.
5 Trade-reform
is passed if and only if more than half of all workers vote for it. Workers know the cost
q ‡ 0 they have to incur to have the option of switching when they vote. Regarding the
individual-specific cost ci ‡ 0 that workers only have to pay if they actually switch, FR
discuss two cases:  (I) workers know this cost when they vote; (II) workers find out about
this cost only after trade-reform is passed (if they paid q ) and therefore face individual-
specific uncertainty when they have to vote. When there is individual-specific uncertainty, it
is such that workers only know the distribution of individual-specific costs among workers
in their sector.
6 All workers have identical preferences and vote for trade-reform if and only
if it increases their (expected) utility. Their utility function is  () X vPI  where I  is the wage
in terms of good Y  and  () X vP  is strictly decreasing in  X P .
How will uncertainty about individual-specific costs of switching between sectors
affect workers’ vote on trade-reform? It is clear that workers initially in sector  X  will vote
for trade-reform and stay in sector  X  if trade-reform is passed whether or not there is
individual-specific uncertainty ex-ante. This is because their wages remain constant in terms
of good  X  and increase in terms of good Y , while the wages of workers in sector Y
remain constant in terms of good Y  and decrease in terms of good  X .
The key-question is therefore whether workers initially in sector Y  will vote for or
against trade-reform. To answer this question in the case with individual-specific
uncertainty, suppose that trade-reform has been passed and consider workers i  in sector Y
who have incurred q  and found out about their individual-specific cost of switching ci .
These workers must now decide whether to incur ci  to actually go to work in sector  X .
Evidently, they will, at this point, switch to sector  X  if and only if the resulting wage-
increase is greater than their individual-specific cost of switching. This implies that their
end-of-period payoff would be
V c v P w c w U i X X i Y
+ + + = - - - ( ) ( ) , Max   q q { }, (1)
where  PX
+  and wX
+  denote the price of good  X  and the wage in sector  X  after trade-
reform. The end-of-period payoff of workers initially in sector Y  if trade-reform is rejected
is V*
V v P w X Y * ( )
* = , (2)
                                                       
5 FR interpret the common cost as a sector-specific human-capital investment that must be made to be able
to switch sector and the individual-specific cost as capturing sector-specific productivity-differences.
6 There is a slight ambiguity in FR on whether workers know the distribution of individual-specific costs
among the whole population or among workers in the their sector.  Implicitly they are assuming that
workers know the distribution among workers in their sector.￿ 9 ￿
where PX
*  denotes the price of good  X  before trade-reform. Recall that in the case with
individual-specific uncertainty about switching-costs at the time workers have to vote, it is
assumed that workers only know the distribution of c  among workers in their sector. All
workers in sector Y  are therefore identical ex-ante. Their expected utility from trade-
reform in the case with individual-specific uncertainty at the time they have to vote is
therefore  () U EVc
+  if they plan to incur q  after reform is passed; the expectation is taken
using the distribution of c  among workers in sector Y . Workers in sector Y  will
consequently vote for trade-reform in the case with uncertainty about individual-specific
switching-costs if and only if
*() U VEVc
+ £ . (3)
If (3) holds and trade-reform is passed, then workers initially in sector Y  will incur q  and
find out about their actual individual-specific cost of switching. If their individual-specific
cost turns out to be lower than the wage-increase from switching to sector  X , they will
switch sector. If (3) does not hold, then workers in sector Y  will all vote against trade-
reform.
In the case without uncertainty about individual-specific costs of switching between
sectors, the end-of-period payoff of workers initially in sector Y  with individual-specific
cost ci  is
V c v P w c w C i X X i Y
+ + + = - - ( ) ( ) , Max   q { } (4)
if trade-reform is passed. The difference between (4) and (1) arises because, in the case
without individual-specific uncertainty, workers will incur q  only if they end up switching
sector. Combining (4) with (2) yields that workers initially in sector Y  will vote for trade-
reform in the case without individual-specific uncertainty if and only if their cost ci  satisfies
V V c C i * ( ) £
+ . (5)
Figure 1 depicts the ex-post payoffs of workers in sector Y  if they vote for trade-reform in
the case with individual specific uncertainty,  () U Vc
+ , and in the case without individual-
specific uncertainty,  () C Vc
+ . The figure also depicts the ex-post payoff of workers in sector
Y  in the case trade-reform is rejected,  * V . It is assumed that workers in sector Y  with
zero individual-specific cost of switching are ex-post better off with trade-reform;
otherwise workers in sector Y  would always vote against trade-reform with or without
individual-specific uncertainty. The reason why V c C
+( ) lies below V * for large c is that
workers who stay in sector Y  are always worse off with trade-reform than without as the
relative price of good  X  increases. V c C
+( ) lies above  () U Vc
+  for large c because, in the￿ 10 ￿
case with individual-specific uncertainty, workers in sector Y  who vote for trade-reform
will always incur the cost q  to have the option of switching sector.
Figure 1: Payoff With and Without Trade-Reform.













Notes: The convex function labeled V c C
+( )  is the end-of-period payoff of workers initially in sector
Y  as a function of the individual-specific cost of switching sectors c  if trade-reform is enacted and
they know their individual-specific cost before trade-reform. The convex function labeled V c U
+( )  is
the end-of-period payoff of workers initially in sector Y  as a function of the individual-specific cost
of switching sector if they are uncertain about their individual-specific cost before trade-reform and
plan to incur q  after trade-reform is enacted.
FR show that in this static trade-model there is no status quo bias because: (I) while
there are instances where trade-reform would pass without individual-specific uncertainty
but not with individual-specific uncertainty; (II) there are also instances where trade-reform
would pass with individual-specific uncertainty but not without individual-specific
uncertainty. To understand (I), suppose that (3) is not satisfied. In this case, trade-reform
will be rejected with individual-specific uncertainty if workers initially in sector Y
constitute a majority of all workers in the economy. However, trade-reform would pass
without individual-specific uncertainty if workers in sector Y  for whom (5) holds combined
with workers in sector  X  constitute a majority of all workers in the economy. To
understand (II), suppose that (3) is satisfied but that workers in sector Y  for whom (5)
does not hold constitute a majority of all workers in the economy. In this case, trade-reform
is rejected without individual-specific uncertainty but would pass with individual-specific
uncertainty. The remaining question is whether (5) not holding for a majority of workers
and (3) holding for workers in sector Y  are consistent. To see that they are suppose first
that the distribution of ci is symmetric. In this case, the two conditions are consistent
because the fact that workers in sector Y  can stay in sector Y  if individual-specific costs of
switching turn out to be high implies that  ) (c VU
+  is a strictly convex function of c. Hence,
workers in sector Y  are effectively risk-loving and the expected value  () U EVc
+  may be￿ 11 ￿
greater than V * although  ()* C VcV
+ < for strictly more than half of the possible values of
c , see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). Another reason why the two conditions are
consistent is that the mean of the distribution of ci may be lower than the median (the
distribution may be skewed to the left).
2.2 The Two-Period Model
In the static model there is no status quo bias introduced by individual-specific uncertainty
as individual-specific uncertainty may lead to trade-reform being passed in instances where
it would not have passed without it. FR therefore consider a two-period version of their
trade-model to establish a status quo bias. In the two-period model, workers vote twice on
trade-reform: in the beginning of the first period and, again, in the beginning of the second
period. Trade-reform can be reversed costlessly and decisions are still made by majority-
rule. Immediately after trade-reform has been enacted in the first period, workers decide on
whether to incur the cost q  necessary to have the option of switching to sector  X .
Immediately after q  has been incurred, they decide on whether to also incur the individual-
specific cost ci  and go to work in sector  X  during the first period. Workers who have
switched to sector  X  in the first period can costlessly switch back to sector Y  in the
second period. Total labor income of workers consists of their wage in the first period and
their wage in the second period. In the case without individual-specific uncertainty, all
workers know their total cost of switching sector  i c q +  in the beginning of the first period.
In the case with individual-specific uncertainty, they only know q  and the distribution of  i c
among workers in their sector in the beginning of the first period; they find out about  i c
only if trade-reform is passed and they incur q .
The possible equilibrium outcomes in the two-period model are: trade-reform is
rejected in the first and in the second period (no trade-reform); trade-reform is passed in the
first period and revoked in the second period (temporary trade-reform); and trade-reform is
passed in the first period and not revoked in the second period (permanent trade-reform).
7
The next table compares equilibrium outcomes with and without individual-specific
uncertainty in the beginning of the first period.
Table 2: Trade-Reform in the Two-Period Model
CERTAINTY UNCERTAINTY
Permanent Trade-Reform Permanent Trade-Reform/Temporary
Trade-Reform/No Trade-Reform
No Trade-Reform Permanent Trade-Reform/Temporary
                                                       
7 It is straightforward to show that it is impossible that trade-reform is rejected in the first period and
passed in the second period.￿ 12 ￿
Trade-Reform/No Trade-Reform
Notes: Permanent trade-reform refers to trade-reform being passed in the first period and not
revoked in the second period. Temporary trade-reform refers to trade-reform being passed in the
first period but revoked in the second. No trade-reform refers to trade-reform being rejected in both
periods.
The first row of the table indicates that, considering all instances where under certainty
there would be permanent trade-reform, there are some instances where individual-specific
uncertainty in the beginning of the first period implies that trade-reform will be in place in
the first but not in the second period (temporary trade-reform) as well as some instances
where trade-reform will neither be in place in the first nor in the second period (no trade-
reform). The second row of the table states that considering all instances where under
certainty there would be no trade-reform, there are some instances where individual-
specific uncertainty implies that trade-reform will be in place in the first period only
(temporary trade-reform) as well as some instances where trade-reform would be in place
in the first and second period (permanent trade-reform). The first and second row of the
table taken together yield that there may be permanent trade-reform with individual-specific
uncertainty in cases it would have been rejected in both periods without and vice-versa.
Hence, individual-specific uncertainty does not generate an asymmetry as defined by FR
and there is no bias towards the status quo in the two-period trade-model.
The intuition for why there may be no trade-reform with individual-specific
uncertainty in the beginning of the first period in instances where there would be a
permanent trade-reform under certainty is analogous to the static model. The ex-ante
expected payoff of workers in sector Y  from trade-reform may be lower than the payoff
without trade-reform although many workers have a low individual-specific cost of
switching. The other cases in the first row of the table are equally straightforward.
Understanding why there may be a permanent trade-reform with individual-specific
uncertainty in the beginning of the first period in instances where there would be no trade-
reform under certainty is somewhat more complex. First, suppose that workers i initially in
sector Y  for whom
( ) * ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( ) 1 1 1 + ‡ = + - - + + + + d d q d V W c v P w c w C i X i Y Max{   } (6)
holds constitute a strict majority of all workers in the economy; d ‡0 denotes the discount
rate applied to second period payoffs and  * V  is defined in (2). In this case, trade-reform
will be rejected in the first period and in the second period if there is no individual-specific￿ 13 ￿
uncertainty in the beginning of the first period. This is because (6) implies that permanent














In this case, all workers in sector Y  will vote for trade-reform in the case with individual-
specific uncertainty in the beginning of the first period if they believe that trade-reform will
not be revoked in the second period if passed in the first period.
9 Workers’ beliefs that
trade-reform, if passed in the first period, will not be revoked in the second period will be
rational if workers in sector Y  who do not switch to sector  X  in the first period (after
trade-reform has been passed) are a minority, i.e. less than half of all workers in the
economy. This is because all workers who work in sector  X  at the end of the first period
will support trade-reform in the beginning of the second period, independently of whether
they have always been working in sector  X  or whether they switched from sector Y .
Third, suppose that workers i  in sector Y  for whom
( ) ( ) 1 1 + - £ + + d d w c w X i Y (8)
holds are a minority. This implies that, if trade-reform has been enacted in the first period
and workers believe that trade-reform will not be revoked in the second period, then
workers who switch to sector  X  plus workers already in sector  X  will be a majority in the
beginning of the second period. Workers’ beliefs that trade-reform, if passed in the first
period, will not be revoked in the second period are therefore rational if (8) holds. If the
conditions associated with (6), (7), and (8) do not logically contradict each other, then
there are instances where there will be a permanent trade-reform with individual-specific
uncertainty in the beginning of the first period although there would have been no trade-
reform without individual-specific uncertainty. Hence, there is no status quo bias
introduced by uncertainty in the two-period trade-model.
                                                       
8 The condition in (6) assumes implicitly that workers believe that trade-reform is not revoked in the
second period if passed in the first period. It is demonstrated in the appendix, however, that the same
condition implies that a majority of workers would vote against trade-reform even if they believed that
trade-reform would be revoked in the second period if passed in the first.
9 It is assumed that workers in sector Y  believe that if trade-reform is rejected in the first period then it
will also be rejected in the second period. It is demonstrated in the appendix that (7) implies that workers
in sector Y  would vote for trade-reform in the first period even if they believed that trade-reform would be
accepted in the second period if rejected in the first period.￿ 14 ￿
To see that the three conditions do not logically contradict each other, it is useful to
consider Figure 2. The first of the three conditions, that workers in sector Y  for whom (6)
holds constitute a strict majority of all workers in the economy, corresponds to the
assumption that workers in sector Y  with individual-specific cost above cL are more than
half of the workers in the economy. The third condition, that workers in sector Y  for
whom (8) holds constitute a minority, corresponds to the assumption that workers in sector
Y  with individual-specific cost above cU  are half or less of all workers in the economy.
The figure also illustrates the second condition, (1)*() C VEWc d
+ +£ . The reasons why
(1)* V d + ,  () C Wc
+ , and  () U Wc
+  lie the way illustrated in Figure 2 are detailed in the
previous section before Figure 1.
Figure 2: Trade-Reform in the Two-Period Model



















Notes: The three conditions in the text illustrated. Workers with costs of switching above cU  (cL)
are a minority (majority) of all workers in the economy. In this case, not enough workers support
trade-reform with certainty about individual-specific costs in the beginning of the first period. But,
with individual-specific uncertainty in the beginning of the first period, trade-reform is passed in the
first period and not revoked in the second period if workers believe that trade-reform will not be
revoked in the second period if passed in the first period.
It is straightforward to see why the second condition is consistent with the third
condition: the smaller the number of people with high individual-specific switching-costs,
the higher the expected value from trade-reform for workers in sector Y . The reason why
the second condition is also consistent with the first condition is analogous to the static
model. First consider the case where the distribution of ci is symmetric. In this case, the
two conditions are consistent because the fact that workers in sector Y  can stay in sector
Y  if individual-specific costs of switching turn out to be high implies that W c U
+( ) is a
strictly convex function of c. Hence, workers in sector Y  are effectively risk-loving with
respect to trade-reform when they face individual-specific uncertainty at the time they vote.￿ 15 ￿
Another reason why the two conditions are consistent is that the distribution of c may be
skewed to the left.
10
The more difficult question is, are the first and third condition consistent? To put it
differently, why would some workers in sector Y  go to work in sector  X  in the first
period after they find out about their individual-specific switching-cost although they would
have voted against enacting trade-reform had they know their switching-cost. There are
two reasons:
(I) The first reason operates even if the cost of having the option of switching q  is zero
(and hence workers have not incurred any sunk cost at the time they have to decide
whether to switch sector). Workers in sector Y  who vote against trade-reform in the
beginning of the first period if there is no individual-specific uncertainty do so because they
are better off in sector Y  at before-trade-reform prices than in sector  X  at after-trade-
reform prices once they take into account their cost of switching. Workers in sector Y  who
switch to sector  X  once trade-reform has been passed in the first period do so because
they are better of in sector  X  at after-trade-reform prices that in sector Y  at after-trade-
reform prices. As relative prices change in favour of sector  X  after trade-reform is
enacted, there are workers in sector Y  who go to work in sector  X  if trade-reform is
passed in the first period although they would have voted against enacting trade-reform had
they know their cost in the beginning of the first period.
(II) The second reason is simpler. Workers in sector Y  who vote against trade-reform in
the beginning of the first period if there is no individual-specific uncertainty do so because
they are better off in sector Y  at before-trade-reform prices than in sector  X  at after-
trade-reform prices taking into account their total cost of switching  i c q + . The decision to
switch sector is, however, based on the individual-specific cost of switching  i c  only as the
cost of having the option of switching q  is assumed to be sunk. Hence, if the cost of
having the option of switching sector q  is strictly positive, then there is an additional
reason why some workers in sector Y  go to work in sector  X  in the first period if trade-
reform is passed although they would have voted against enacting trade-reform had they
know their switching-cost.
A fourth condition needs to be satisfied for the equilibrium where trade-reform is
enacted in the first period and not revoked in the second period in the case with individual-
specific uncertainty in the beginning of the first period to the unique equilibrium in
                                                       
10 The argument to establish that there are some instances where there will be a temporary trade-reform
with individual-specific uncertainty in the beginning of the first period although there would be no trade-
reform without individual-specific uncertainty is straightforward and therefore omitted.￿ 16 ￿
instances where trade-reform would be rejected in both period under certainty. This
condition is that workers i  in sector Y  for whom
w c w X i Y
+ - £ (9)
holds are a minority. In this case, if workers in sector Y  support trade-reform in the
beginning of the first period in the case with individual-specific uncertainty, then they must
necessarily believe that trade-reform will not be revoked in the beginning of the second
period. To see this note first that workers initially in sector Y  will always incur q  if they
voted for enacting trade-reform in the beginning of the first period. Hence, their decision of
changing sector is based on the individual-specific cost of switching only. Once they have
incurred q  their net gain of switching to sector Y  is equal to  XiY wcw
+ -- if they believe
that trade-reform will be revoked in the second period. Hence, the condition in (9) implies
that if trade-reform is enacted, then workers who stay in sector Y  in the first period and
vote against trade-reform in the beginning of the second period will be a minority, even if
all workers were to believe that trade-reform would be revoked in the second period.
Consequently, it would be irrational for workers in sector Y  to support trade-reform in the
beginning of the first period and at the same time believe that trade-reform will be revoked
in the beginning of the second period.
4  Summary
Can individual-specific uncertainty lead to a bias against efficiency-enhancing economic
policies? The first point made in this paper is that individual-specific uncertainty may
increase the chances of policies benefiting a majority ex-post being rejected ex-ante. This is
true, however, whether these economic policies increase or decrease aggregate efficiency.
Individual-specific uncertainty may therefore decrease the probability that efficiency-
enhancing policies are enacted but, at the same time, increase the probability that enacted
policies are efficiency-enhancing. The main point made in the paper is that individual-
specific uncertainty can actually strictly increase the chances of a permanent trade-reform in
FR’s dynamic trade-model. The reason is that trade-reform, once enacted, may not be
revoked in future elections (when workers no longer face any individual-specific
uncertainty) even if trade-reform would not have been enacted in the first place without
individual-specific uncertainty. This is because trade-reform increases the relative price of
the good produced in the sector gaining from reform. Some workers will therefore go to
work in the sector that gains once reform has been passed and uncertainty has been
resolved (even if they have not incurred any sunk cost), although they would have voted
against enacting trade-reform in the first place had there been no uncertainty. These￿ 17 ￿
workers will vote against revoking trade-reform in future elections. This argument
generalizes to voting on any type of reform. In a realistic setting, reform will increase the
incentives of agents to move into those economic activities that have benefited from the
new economic policies. Some agents will therefore move into these economic activities
once reform has been passed, even if they would have voted against reform without
individual-specific uncertainty. Hence, support in favor of sustaining reform once
individual-specific uncertainty has been resolved will be greater than support for enacting
reform if there is no individual-specific uncertainty. Individual-specific uncertainty may
therefore increase the chances of permanent reform.￿ 18 ￿
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Appendix
(A1) Proof that workers will vote against enacting trade-reform in the beginning of the first
period without individual-specific uncertainty if workers in sector Y  for whom (6) holds
are more than half of all workers in the economy even if they believe that trade-reform, if
passed in the first period, will be revoked in the second period.
In this case, the payoff of workers in sector Y  with individual-specific cost ci  in the
beginning of the first period, if trade-reform is passed, is
v P w c w V X i Y ( ) , *
+ + - - + Max{   } q d .  (A1)
If workers in sector Y  for whom (6) holds constitute a majority of all workers in the
economy, then workers in sector Y  for whom (A1) is smaller than ( ) * 1+d V  are also a
majority. This is because (6) implies that
V v P w c w X i Y * ( ) /( ) /( ), ‡ - + - + + + Max{   } 1 1 d q d  and hence, because d ‡0, that
V v P w c w X i Y * ( ) , ‡ - - + + Max{   } q .
(A2) Proof that workers in sector Y  will vote for trade-reform in the beginning of the first
period with individual-specific uncertainty if (7) holds even if they believe that trade-
reform, if rejected in the first period, will be passed in the second period.
In this case, the ex-ante payoff for workers in sector Y  if trade-reform is rejected in the
first period is
V Ev P w c w v P w X i Y Y * ( ) , , ( ) + - - -
+ + + d q q Max Max{   } { }. (A2)
This is because they will only pay q  in the second period if the expected payoff in the
beginning of the second period from switching into sector  X  is greater than the payoff
from staying in sector Y . To see that (7) implies that (A2) is smaller than
Ev P w c w X i Y ( ) ,( )
+ + - - + - Max{(1+ ) } d q d q 1  it is useful to distinguish two cases.
(I) The first case is  Ev P w c w v P w X i Y Y ( ) , ( )
+ + + - - - < Max{   } q q . This implies
Ev P w c w V X i Y ( ) , *
+ + - - - £ Max{   } q q  and hence that (A2) is smaller than ( ) * 1+d V .
Combined with (7) this yields the result.
(II) The second case is  Ev P w c w v P w X i Y Y ( ) , ( )
+ + + - - - ‡ Max{   } q q . In this case (7)
implies that (A2) is smaller than
Ev P w c w
Ev P w c w
X i Y
X i Y




- + - + - +
+ - - -
Max{ }
Max{   }
1 1 1 d q d q d
d q q
. (A3)
(A3), and therefore (A2), is smaller than
Ev P w c w
Ev P w c w
X i Y
X i Y
( ) ,( )
( ) ( ) / ( ) /( ), /( )
+ +
+ +
- - + -
= + - + - + - +
Max{(1+ ) }
Max{ }
d q d q
d d q d q d
1
1 1 1 1
(A4)
because  0 d ‡  implies￿ 20 ￿
Ev P w c w








£ - + - + - +
Max{   }
Max{ }
q q
d q d q d 1 1 1
. (A5)